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IS THERE SOLIDARITY ON ASYLUM AND MIGRATION 
IN THE EU?
Iris Goldner Lang*
Summary: Solidarity is one of the core values of the European Uni-
on and has been recognised as a guiding principle of the EU asylum 
policy since the coming into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam. It is 
now incorporated into Article 80 TFEU, which provides that EU polici-
es on border checks, asylum and immigration must be ‘governed by 
the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including 
its financial implications, between the Member States’. The need for 
solidarity in the area of asylum and migration stems from the fact that 
some Member States have more asylum seekers than others, some 
have more refugees than others, and some have more difficulties in 
coping with them for a number of geographic, economic and other re-
asons. A range of measures could be used to support the functioning 
of solidarity, such as: financial assistance, practical cooperation, re-
location, resettlement, and joint processing. This paper will discuss 
the potentials and (limited) progress in applying some of these mea-
sures. It will start by discussing Member States’ obligations towards 
refugees under international and EU asylum law. The discussion will 
then move on to identifying the meaning of solidarity, its value in prac-
tice and Member States’ motivations for establishing solidarity mecha-
nisms. Potential differences between solidarity, burden-sharing and 
responsibility-sharing will also be considered. Divergent perspectives 
on the solidarity existing in different Member States with and without 
external borders will also be taken into account. The paper will conclu-
de by discussing potential prospects on solidarity in the context of the 
problematic relation between the Dublin ‘state of first entry’ rule and 
the application of the principle of solidarity.
1. Introduction
The functioning of the EU internal market involves the abolishment 
of internal frontiers between Member States in order to enable free mo-
vement.1 The elimination of internal borders between EU Member States 
has been one of the greatest achievements of the European Union. Howe-
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ver, removing the internal border controls for persons is closely linked 
with the need to harmonise Member States’ rules on asylum, immigra-
tion and external border controls.2 On the other hand, the creation of a 
common asylum and migration policy - which aims to prevent a Member 
States’ race to the bottom, by protecting human rights standards and 
by restraining national measures and policies that would deter refugees 
and asylum-seekers from third countries – should go hand in hand with 
a functioning burden-sharing mechanism. Such a mechanism would di-
minish reasons for (re)imposing harmful unilateral national measures 
and make the commonly agreed system sustainable even for the most 
pressured Member States. Such a system – where all the Member States 
are expected to abide by the common rules and standards in the area of 
asylum and migration, while certain Member States, particularly those 
creating the Union’s external borders, can be expected to be exposed to 
a higher number of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers – needs to be 
based on solidarity between all the Member States. 
The principle of solidarity in EU asylum and migration law has many 
facets. For the purpose of this paper, the following four are identified: 
loyalty, trust, fairness and necessity. On the one hand, solidarity involves 
Member States’ loyalty in fulfilling the obligations arising from their EU 
membership.3 All Member States have committed themselves to adhere 
to EU primary and secondary law and properly implement Union poli-
cies. This obligation includes both Member States exposed to more and 
those exposed to fewer external pressures. On the other hand, solidarity 
is the expression of trust between Member States which have abolis-
hed internal borders among themselves. Thirdly, solidarity involves the 
willingness of those Member States exposed to a lower number of mi-
grants, refugees and asylum seekers to assist the ones in need of help 
and support, primarily those forming the external Union border. In this 
context, the meaning of solidarity can be associated to ‘fairness’, as the 
Dublin Regulation enables a Member State to return an asylum seeker 
to the Member State which the asylum seeker first entered, as the state 
responsible for the examination of the asylum claim. This rule increases 
the uneven distribution of asylum seekers as it creates much more pre-
ssure on the Union’s external borders, while relieving the Member States 
with no such borders. Finally, solidarity can be associated with necessity. 
By helping Member States in need, other Member States work towards a 
more secure and stable Union. Therefore, one can claim that the role of 
solidarity is to act as a joint insurance policy mechanism which increases 
the stability of the EU as a whole. Out of these four facets of solidarity, 
2 See Art 67(2) TFEU; Case C-378/97 Criminal proceedings v Florus Ariël Wijsenbeek 
[1999] ECR I-06207, para 40.
3  The principle of loyal or sincere cooperation as stipulated by Art 4(3) TEU.
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some seem to be strongly present, while others are seriously lacking. So, 
if we define solidarity as mutual trust, then it is currently missing. On the 
other hand, if we define it as necessity and a legal obligation stemming 
from the principle of sincere cooperation, it exists, at least to a certain 
extent. Generally speaking, the underlying idea of solidarity is to provide 
a common and fundamental rights compliant mechanism which is able 
to respond to all the migratory and asylum-related pressures in all EU 
Member States, also at times of global crises and increased migratory 
flows. 
This paper will address solidarity in the area of EU asylum and mi-
gration law. It will start by discussing Member States’ obligations towards 
refugees under international and EU asylum law. It will try to identify the 
meaning of solidarity, its value in practice and Member States’ motivati-
ons for establishing solidarity mechanisms. Potential differences between 
solidarity, burden-sharing and responsibility-sharing will also be consi-
dered. The paper will analyse different solidarity tools and instruments, 
such as financial assistance, practical cooperation, relocation, resettle-
ment, and joint processing. It will discuss the degree to which different 
instruments oblige EU Member States to assume each others’ responsi-
bilities, and will explore the potentials and (limited) progress in applying 
some of these measures. Divergent perspectives on solidarity existing in 
different Member States with and without external borders will also be 
taken into account. The concluding part will discuss potential views on 
solidarity in the context of the problematic relation between the Dublin 
‘state of first entry’ rule and the application of the principle of solidarity. 
2. Responsibilities towards refugees under international and EU law
The obligations of EU Member States towards refugees stem both 
from EU law and a number of international conventions which have been 
signed by all the Member States. The 1951 Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees is the most important international document rele-
vant for refugee law.4 Under its Article 1A(2), the term ‘refugee’ applies to 
any person who 
...owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or po-
litical opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, 
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that 
country...5 
4 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 
22 April 1954) 189 UNTS 137 (1951 Convention); Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 
(adopted 31 November 1967, entered into force 4 October 1967) 606 UNTS 267.
5 For a detailed account of the refugee definition, see Andrew Shacknove, ‘Who Is a Refu-
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No state may expel or return (refouler) a refugee ‘to the frontiers of 
territories where his life or freedom would be threatened’ on these groun-
ds.6 The 1951 Convention also defines the economic, social and political 
rights of refugees. EU Member States’ responsibilities set by the 1951 
Convention stem from both the Convention itself and Article 78 TFEU 
which requires the EU asylum policy to be ‘in accordance with the Con-
vention and other relevant treaties’. Furthermore, the Convention against 
Torture explicitly prohibits refoulement that could lead to torture by sti-
pulating that no state shall expel, return (refouler) or extradite a person 
to another state ‘where there are substantial grounds for believing that 
he would be in danger of being subjected to torture’.7 The implementation 
of the CAT is examined and supervised by the Committee against Tortu-
re, a body established under Article 17 of the CAT. Finally, the Internatio-
nal Covenant on Civil and Political Rights implicitly prohibits refoulement 
where there is fear of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment by declaring that ‘no one shall be subjected to torture or to 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’.8 The ICCPR is 
monitored by the Human Rights Committee. 
The European Convention on Human Rights also implicitly prohibits 
refoulement by stating that ‘no one shall be subjected to torture or to in-
human or degrading treatment or punishment’.9 Accordingly, the ECtHR 
has in a number of cases held that states cannot deport or extradite per-
sons who might be subject to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment. In its landmark ruling Soering v UK, the ECtHR esta-
blished that extradition of a German national to the USA to face capital 
punishment violated Article 3 ECHR due to the likelihood of the feared 
exposure of the applicant to the ‘death row phenomenon’. The ECtHR 
thus concluded that an extradition decision can engage the responsibi-
lity of the extraditing state ‘where substantial grounds have been shown 
for believing that the person concerned, if extradited, faces a real risk of 
being subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or pu-
nishment in the requesting country’.10 A number of other cases followed, 
such as Chahal v UK (a deportation order to India of a Sikh separatist on 
grounds of national security),11 Jabari v Turkey (a deportation order of 
Ms Jabari to Iran which created a real risk of subjecting her to death by 
gee?’ (1985)  95(2)  Ethics 274; James Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status (Butterworths 
1991).
6 Art 33(1) of the 1951 Convention.
7 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punis-
hment (10 December 1984, entered into force 26 June 1987) 1465 UNTS 85 (CAT) art 3(1).
8 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 19 December 1966, ente-
red into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) art 7.
9 Art 3 ECHR. 
10 Soering v United Kingdom App no 14038/88 (ECtHR, 7 July 1989) para 91.
11 Chahal v United Kingdom, App no 22414/93 (ECtHR, 15 November 1996).
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stoning),12 YP and LP v France (the deportation of an opponent of the re-
gime and his family to Belarus)13 and Hirsi (Somali and Eritrean migrants 
who had been travelling from Libya and were intercepted at sea by the 
Italian authorities and sent back to Libya, thus violating Article 3 as they 
faced a risk of being arbitrarily returned to their countries of origin).14 
In the context of EU law, EU Member States decided to create a 
Common European Asylum System (CEAS) that would reduce the large 
differences between their asylum systems and practices and establish 
common minimum standards for asylum. By 2005, a number of legi-
slative acts were adopted within CEAS, the most important being three 
directives and a regulation: the Reception Conditions Directive,15 the Qu-
alification Directive,16 the Asylum Procedures Directive,17 and the Dublin 
Regulation.18 
EU rules in these legal acts mostly reflect the obligations set by the 
1951 Convention, but also enable more favourable national provisions.19 
The possibility of applying more favourable standards is thus invoked in 
the three EU legislative acts on asylum adopted by 2005: Article 4 of the 
Reception Conditions Directive, Article 3 of the Qualification Directive 
and Article 5 of the Asylum Procedures Directive. Directive 2003/9 on 
reception conditions of asylum seekers (Reception Conditions Directive) 
lays down minimum standards and conditions of reception of asylum 
seekers and is mostly concerned with their social rights as it deals with 
issues such as welfare and employment. The 2004/83 Qualification Di-
rective sets the conditions for the qualification and status of third-country 
nationals and stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise 
need international protection. Directive 2004/83 has been amended by 
Directive 2011/9520 which will repeal Directive 2004/83 and has to be 
12 Jabari v Turkey, App no 40035/98 (ECtHR, 11 July 2000). 
13 YP and LP v France, App no 32476/06 (ECtHR, 2 September 2010).
14 Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy, App no 27765/09 (ECtHR, 23 February 2012).
15 Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 laying down minimum standards for 
the reception of asylum seekers [2003] OJ L31/18.
16 Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the quali-
fication and status of third country nationals and stateless persons as refugees or as per-
sons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted 
[2004] OJ L304/12.
17 Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standards on procedu-
res in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status [2005] OJ L326/13.
18 Council Regulation (EC) 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and 
mechanisms for determining the member state responsible for examining an asylum appli-
cation lodged in one of the member states by a third-country national [2003] OJ L50.
19 For the relation between EU and international asylum law, see Hemme Battjes, Europe-
an Asylum Law and International Law (Martinus Nijhoff 2006).
20 Council and Parliament Directive 2011/95/EU of 13 December 2011 on standards for 
the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of interna-
tional protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary pro-
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transposed into national law by 21 December 2013. The 2005/85/EC 
Asylum Procedures Directive establishes minimum standards on proce-
dures for granting and withdrawing refugee status in EU Member States. 
Finally, the Dublin II Regulation establishes the criteria and mechanisms 
for determining the Member State responsible for examining the asylum 
application. It is based on the principle that only one Member State is 
responsible for examining an asylum application. In practice, this is usu-
ally the state first entered which, in effect, shifts the responsibility to the 
Member States which form the southern and eastern borders of the EU 
with third countries. The Regulation has been heavily criticised and re-
cent developments, culminating in the MSS judgment of the ECtHR and 
the NS judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, have 
revealed serious deficiencies in the system. 
Even though proposals to revise all four acts have existed since 
2008, only the revision of the Qualification Directive has been adopted 
so far, while all the other amended proposals are still in the pipeline. The 
proposals are said to address the deficiencies in the existing acts and 
do present an improvement of the current standards, but are criticised 
for leaving a number of issues vague and for satisfying only a rather 
low level of protection of fundamental rights instead of aiming for higher 
standards. The Proposal to recast the Reception Conditions Directive is 
thus viewed as a ‘missed opportunity’ by those advocating more dignified 
and fairer treatment of asylum seekers.21 On the other hand, the Recast 
Qualification Directive and the Proposal to recast the Asylum Procedures 
Directive,22 even though viewed as a significant step forward, are consi-
dered to leave certain standards vague or unsatisfactory.23 The fact that 
the proposed Dublin III Regulation24 maintains the underlying principles 
of Dublin II, which has proved to have ‘extensive detrimental effects to 
Member States and asylum seekers’ and will not address those deficien-
cies, has been heavily criticised by ECRE as ‘not defensible’. ECRE has 
tection, and for the content of the protection granted [2011] OJ L337 (Recast Qualification 
Directive).
21 Steve Peers, ‘Analysis: The EU Directive on Reception Conditions: A Weak Compromise’ 
2012 Statewatch.
22 European Council on Refugees and Exiles, ‘Comment from the European Council on Re-
fugees and Exiles on the European Commission Proposal to recast the Asylum Procedures 
Directive’ (May 2010).
23 European Council on Refugees and Exiles, ’Comments from the European Council on 
Refugees and Exiles on the European Commission Proposal to recast the Qualification Di-
rective’ (March 2010). 
24 Commission (EC), ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Co-
uncil establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State respon-
sible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member 
States by a third-country national or a stateless person’ COM (2008) 820 final, 3 December 
2012 (Draft Dublin III Regulation).
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further contended that ‘an alternate system based on integration accom-
panied by substantial solidarity measures is the only way to ensure a 
fair, efficient and humane CEAS’.25 
3. Solidarity and responsibility-sharing in EU law
The term ‘solidarity’ among EU Member States does not have a sin-
gle, uniform meaning in EU law, but can refer to a number of different 
legal contexts.26 Solidarity among EU Member States is mentioned in the 
Treaties in a number of instances and within different policy areas. It is 
referred to as one of the values the European Union is founded on27 and 
as one of its principles which guides the Union’s action on the interna-
tional scene.28 It is also mentioned in the context of the Union’s external 
action as ‘mutual political solidarity among Member States’29 and ‘a spi-
rit of mutual solidarity’.30 Furthermore, the ‘spirit of solidarity between 
Member States’ is addressed in the case of a shortage of supply of certain 
products, notably energy. In the context of energy, ‘a spirit of solidarity 
between Member States’ is invoked as regards the need to preserve and 
improve the environment in the internal market. The principle of solida-
rity has its strongest expression in the ‘solidarity clause’ which creates 
the legal basis for the Union and its Member States to ‘act jointly in a spi-
rit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the 
victim of a natural or man-made disaster’.31 However, apart from being 
one of the guiding principles in relations between EU Member States, the 
need for solidarity is also emphasised between generations.32 Furthermo-
re, the need for financial solidarity or the fact that there is none has been 
brought up in recent political speeches in the context of the EU financial 
crisis,33 and by the Court of Justice34 a number of times. 
25 European Council on Refugees and Exiles, ’Comment from the European Council on 
Refugees and Exiles on the European Commission Proposal to recast the Dublin Regulation’ 
(April 2009).
26 For identifying the role of solidarity in different areas of EU law, see Malcolm Ross, ‘So-
lidarity: A New Constitutional Paradigm for the EU?’ in Malcolm Ross and Yuri Borgmann-
Prebil (eds), Promoting Solidarity in the European Union (Oxford University Press, 2010) 
23-45.
27 Art 2 TEU.
28 Art 21 TEU.
29 Art 24(2) TEU.
30 Art 31 TEU.
31 Art 222 TFEU.
32 Art 3(3) TEU.
33 See for example, Sara Eisen, Interview with Jose Manuel Barosso, European Commi-
ssion President, 12 April 2013  <http://www.bloomberg.com/video/-more-solidarity-for-
cyprus-needed-barroso-says-bJq0~hQmRjWpqTZhHcMcqw.html> accessed 15 April 2012.
34 For example, Case C-184/99 Rudy Grzelczyk v Centre public d’aide sociale d’Ottignies-
Louvain-la-Neuve [2001] ECR I-06193, para 44.
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In the area of asylum, migration and border controls, Treaty articles 
explicitly rely on the principle of solidarity and responsibility-sharing. 
However, solidarity has been referred to in a number of other EU docu-
ments, some preceding the Lisbon Treaty, such as the 1999 Tampere 
Conclusions,35 the 2004 Hague Programme,36 the 2008 European Pact on 
Immigration and Asylum37 and the 2010 Stockholm Programme.38 Article 
80 TFEU is the most explicit formulation of the principle of solidarity. 
However, the ‘principle of sincere cooperation’ laid out in Article 4(3) TEU 
and invoked by the Court of Justice on a number of occasions39 also has 
important implications in the area of asylum, immigration and border 
control, as it obliges EU Member States to ‘assist each other in carrying 
out tasks which flow from the Treaties’. This means that the EU and its 
Member States are obliged to help and support each other in matters re-
lated to asylum, migration and border controls. 
In Title V on the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, solidarity is 
first mentioned in Article 67 as the opening provision.  Article 67(2) TFEU 
invokes ‘solidarity between Member States, which is fair towards third-
country nationals’, as the basis for framing a common policy on asylum, 
immigration and external border control. Article 80 TFEU, as the central 
and most specific call for solidarity in Title V, stipulates:
The policies of the Union set out in this Chapter and their imple-
mentation shall be governed by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing 
of responsibility, including its financial implications, between the Mem-
ber States. Whenever necessary, the Union acts adopted pursuant to this 
Chapter shall contain appropriate measures to give effect to this principle.
Explicit reference to ‘solidarity’ and ‘fair sharing of responsibility’ 
in Article 80 TFEU covers all policies on border checks, asylum and im-
migration. Article 80 TFEU has thus extended the application of the-
se principles from asylum only, as first stipulated by the Amsterdam 
Treaty in Article 63(2)(b)TEC, to border policy and migration. Therefore, 
solidarity should be the guiding principle throughout all the policy are-
as covered by Chapter II of the TFEU. Furthermore, reference to solida-
rity when drafting and implementing all the policies on border checks, 
asylum and immigration shows the intention to apply this principle not 
only in emergency situations, such as a mass inflow of refugees, but also 
35 Council, ‘Presidency Conclusions’ (Tampere, 15-16 October 1999).
36 Council, ‘Presidency Conclusions: The Hague Programme for Strengthening Freedom, 
Security and Justice in the European Union’ (Brussels, 4-5 November 2004).
37 Council, ‘European Pact on Immigration and Asylum’ (Brussels, 24 September 2008).
38 Council, ‘The Stockholm Programme – An Open and Secure Europe Serving and Protec-
ting Citizens, European Council’ [2010] OJ C-115/1.
39 See, for example, Case C-61/11 PPU Hassen El Dridi, alias Karim Soufi [2011] ECR 
I-03015.
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when shaping these policies. However, it is questionable whether Article 
80 TFEU has direct effect, as it can only become effective once certain 
legislative and policy measures have been taken.40 
Solidarity applies both to EU institutions and the Member States. 
However, measuring solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility is not an 
easy task. The Treaty provides no specification to help determine what 
constitutes these terms. Their goals or the benchmarks to measure their 
fulfilment are undefined. In this respect, the interests of EU institutions 
do not necessarily match those of EU Member States, while the intere-
sts of the Member States also frequently diverge. Responsibility-sharing 
can be seen as one of the manifestations of the principle of solidarity, 
implying a fair distribution of burdens, consequent to EU borders, immi-
gration and asylum policies, among EU Member States. The fact that Ar-
ticle 80 TFEU explicitly refers to the ‘financial implications’ of solidarity, 
but does not limit itself only to this manifestation of burden-sharing (as 
implied by the phrase ‘including its financial implications’), suggests the 
importance of financial burden-sharing, but also calls for other forms of 
cooperation among Member States that could lead to burden-shifting to 
Member States under less pressure.41 
Member States’ motivation for solidarity in the area of asylum and 
migration might vary. States that are geographically exposed to a dispro-
portionate number of refugees call for burden-sharing with other, less 
pressured Member States. Their reasons for urging for solidarity are pri-
marily financial, social and political. On the other hand, another type of 
self-interest might encourage other Member States to assist and partici-
pate in the burden-sharing mechanisms. This is primarily the reasoning 
that a joint insurance policy would increase stability and security and 
reduce the possibility of unexpected calamities and harmful unilateral 
actions of those Member States primarily hit by refugees.42  The potential 
of unexpected increases in the number of refugees and asylum seekers in 
one Member State, induced by external factors, can encourage Member 
States to see the advantages and agree to burden-sharing mechanisms. 
This is well illustrated by the example of Austria which had 6,724 asylum 
40  Cf  Wijsenbeek (n 2) para 40 where the Court of Justice stated that then art 7a TEC [now 
art 26 TFEU] does not have direct effect as it ‘presupposes harmonisation of the laws of the 
Member States governing the crossing of the external borders of the Community, immigra-
tion, the grant of visas, asylum and the exchange of information on those questions’.
41 For burden-sharing, see Eiko Thielemann, ‘Between Interests and Norms: Explaining 
Burden-Sharing in the European Union’ (2003) 16(3) Journal of Refugee Studies 253; Eiko 
Thielemann, ‘Towards Refugee Burden-Sharing in the European Union State Interests and 
Policy Options’ (Ninth Biennial International Conference of the European Union Studies 
Association, Austin, 31 March-2 April 2005); Rosemary Byrne, ‘Harmonization and Burden 
Distribution in the Two Europes’ (2003) 16(3) Journal of Refugee Studies 336.
42 See Astri Suhrke, ‘Burden-Sharing during Refugee Emergencies: The Logic of Collective 
versus National Action’ (1998) 11(4) Journal of Refugee Studies 396.
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applications in 1985, compared to 27,306 asylum applications in 1991 – 
7,506 of those coming from Romania and 6,436 from former Yugoslavia 
(due to the armed conflict there). The number again fell drastically to 
4,745 in 1993, again rising to 39,355 in 2002.43
The ability of one Member State to effectively handle immigrants, 
refugees and asylum seekers, while preserving human rights standards, 
might have positive consequences for all the other Member States, as it 
reduces irregular migration and increases internal security. The entry of 
a high number of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers into one Mem-
ber State might have serious consequences for its neighbours, as was 
vividly shown in the case of the Franco-Italian affair of spring 2011 when 
hundreds of North African immigrants from Tunisia came to Italy and 
were issued with resident permits for humanitarian reasons, allowing 
them to exercise an automatic right of freedom of movement to other 
Member States. The French authorities reacted by reintroducing border 
controls on the Franco-Italian border, by blocking trains and sending the 
incoming immigrants back to the Italian territory.44
4. Solidarity tools and instruments 
Several tools and instruments have been developed and could be 
employed for the purpose of enabling and promoting solidarity and bur-
den-sharing in the area of asylum and migration. Some of these tools pro-
vide for financial assistance (such as the European Refugee Fund), while 
others enable assistance in kind (such as relocation and resettlement). 
Some of them have, to a higher or lesser degree, already been employed, 
while others are still unrealised ideas put on the table for the future, 
such as joint processing. Despite the fact that there is (still) no consensus 
as to what joint processing would be, in its March 2012 Conclusions, the 
Council invited the Commission to prepare a study on the feasibility of 
joint processing of asylum claims and to report its finding to the Member 
States.45 
43  Eurostat asylum statistics, ‘Asylum Applications’ <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/
tgm/table.do?tab=table&plugin=0&language=en&pcode=tps00021> accessed 15 April 2012; 
Migration Policy Institute (MPI) Data Hub, ‘Country and Comparative Data’ <http://www.
migrationinformation.org/GlobalData/countrydata/data.cfm> accessed  15 April 2012.
44 For an account of the whole affair, which was characterised as a ‘race to the bottom 
on European principles of solidarity, loyalty and fundamental rights’, see Sergio Carrera 
and others, ‘A Race against Solidarity: The Schengen Regime and the Franco-Italian Affair’ 
(2011) CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe Working Paper April 2011, 1; Sergio Carrera, 
‘An Assessment of the Commission’s 2011 Schengen Governance Package: Preventing Abu-
se by EU Member States of Freedom of Movement?’ (2012) CEPS Liberty and Security in 
Europe Working Paper March 2012, 1.
45 See Council, ‘Council Conclusions on a Common Framework for genuine and practical 
solidarity towards Member States facing particular pressures on their asylum systems, 
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Even though financial support is not the only solidarity instrument, 
it is the most important and effective one for assisting Member States 
in need of help. A number of financial instruments promote solidarity, 
the European Refugee Fund being the longest standing one and cove-
ring asylum procedures, reception infrastructure, integration of refugees, 
resettlement and emergency measures. There are currently four funds 
allocating almost EUR 4 billion under the Framework Programme ‘Solida-
rity and the Management of Migration Flows for the period 2007–2013’: 
the European Refugee Fund (EUR 700 million), the European Borders 
Fund (EUR 1,820 million), the European Return Fund (EUR 630 million) 
and the European Fund for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals 
(EUR 825 million). However, they all seem to have in common the lack of 
adequate resources and over-bureaucratic procedures. They are, therefo-
re, more motivational than compensatory.46  The next Multiannual Finan-
cial Framework for 2014–2020 should reduce the number of programmes 
to two funds: the Asylum and Migration Fund (EUR 3,869 billion) and 
the Internal Security Fund (EUR 4,648 billion). With an overall budget of 
EUR 10.9 billion, the total home affairs budget for the 2014–2020 period 
should exceed the 2007–2013 period by 40%. The Asylum and Migration 
Fund will focus on the integrated management of migration, thus cove-
ring all aspects of migration including asylum, legal migration, integrati-
on and the return of irregularly staying non-EU nationals. On the other 
hand, the Internal Security Fund will concentrate on the implementation 
of the Internal Security Strategy and deal with the management of the 
Union’s external borders. 
Intra-EU relocation is another method of assisting Member States 
exposed to disproportionate external pressures. However, previous prac-
tice has shown that, despite its generally positive impact, intra-EU re-
location is highly limited in scope and based on a political, voluntary 
decision. Its impact is restricted to emergency situations and cases of 
Member States’ exposure to a disproportionate number of refugees excee-
ding their capacities. It is primarily aimed at refugees and persons un-
der subsidiary protection and not at asylum seekers. Relocation should, 
therefore, not be considered as an improvement or compensation of the 
Dublin Regulation. The European Commission’s study of relocation has 
shown that a number of EU Member States preferred other burden-sha-
ring tools, such as policy harmonisation as well as technical and financi-
including through mixed migration flows’, Brussels, 8 March 2012; Commission, ‘Commu-
nication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on enhanced intra-EU 
solidarity in the field of asylum – An EU Agenda for better responsibility-sharing and more 
mutual trust’ COM (2011) 835 final.
46 European Parliament Study, ‘What System of Burden-sharing Between Member States 
for the Reception of Asylum Seekers?’ January 2010, PE 419.620.
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al assistance, to relocation.47 Furthermore, half of the Member States in 
the study were against relocating asylum seekers. This view corresponds 
with the Dublin ‘state of first entry’ rule which sets limits to relocation. 
So far, intra-EU relocation has been taking place from Malta within 
the framework of a European Refugee Fund-funded pilot project EUREMA 
(phases I and II). Malta, being the smallest EU Member State, has been 
exposed to a disproportionate number of refugees. On the other hand, its 
reception conditions have been reported as poor, as has its progress with 
the local integration of newly arrived third-country nationals. Given this 
situation, the EU Home Affairs Commissioner appealed to other Member 
States’ solidarity which resulted in the decision of twelve Member States 
to participate in the EUREMA pilot project, while eight Member States 
and associated countries decided to make bilateral arrangements with 
Malta. The objective was to show solidarity with Malta by relocating 255 
individuals in need. Despite the project’s general success, evaluation has 
shown that the selection criteria were sometimes too demanding, while 
there was a lack of harmonisation as regards the status granted by the 
participating states.48 
Finally, intra-EU relocation should not be confused with the resettle-
ment of refugees from third countries. Resettlement is defined as the 
‘transfer of refugees from a state in which they have sought asylum to 
a third state that has previously agreed to admit them as refugees and 
grant them a form of legal status, with the possibility of acquiring future 
citizenship’.49 Unfortunately, despite increasing worldwide needs for re-
settlement, the EU Member States are not taking the lead and helping 
people in need. Based on the ECRE data, in 2011, the EU collectively re-
settled 4,325 refugees amounting to only 7% of the global total that year 
(61,649 departures).
5. Conclusion
Solidarity is one of the core values of the European Union and has 
been recognised as a guiding principle of the EU asylum, migration and 
border control policies. However, studies have shown that in these areas 
of EU law there is little agreement as to the exact meaning and scope of 
the term ‘solidarity’, although there seems to be common understanding 
47 European Commission, ‘Study on the Feasibility of Establishing a Mechanism for the Re-
location of Beneficiaries of International Protection’, July 2010, JLS/2009/ERFX/PR/1005 
2010-70092056. 
48  European Asylum Support Office, ‘EASO Fact Finding on Intra-EU Relocation Activities 
from Malta’ (July 2012) <http://easo.europa.eu/wp-content/uploads/EUREMA-fact-fin-
ding-report-EASO11.pdf> accessed 26 October 2013.
49 European Asylum Support Office, ‘Resettlement’ <http://www.ecre.org/topics/areas-of-
work/resettlement.html> accessed 26 October 2013.
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that solidarity is important for the functioning of these policy areas.50 The 
Dublin Regulation, with its ‘state of first entry’ criterion as decisive for de-
termining the Member State responsible for examining the asylum appli-
cation, creates a burden-shifting rather than a burden-sharing mecha-
nism. The Dublin system has been heavily criticised as unsustainable 
and undermining asylum seekers’ fundamental rights.  Its successful 
implementation relies on the condition that Member States provide for an 
equal level of protection based on their substantive and procedural rules. 
The Dublin criteria are based on the Member States’ mutual trust in the 
adequate level of quality and efficiency of each other’s asylum system. 
However, several studies, including the UNHCR one, have highlighted di-
vergent practices among Member States and revealed highly different re-
cognition rates for the same profile of asylum seekers.51 It is questionable 
whether the Draft Dublin III Regulation will resolve the open issues and 
ambiguities in terms of allocating responsibility and ensuring protection 
of individuals in need. The Dublin mechanism cannot properly function 
in the event of an unfair or incomplete examination of asylum applica-
tions in some Member States, inadequate access to legal remedies and 
legal representation, and inappropriate detention conditions. 
However, despite inadequate conditions in certain Member States, 
particularly Greece, up to the MSS judgment of the ECtHR and the NS 
judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in 2011, Mem-
ber States were unwilling to suspend transfers to Greece. They were re-
luctant to rely on the ‘suspension clause’ contained in Article 3(2) of the 
Dublin Regulation, presuming that the other Member State was a safe 
country. The NS52 and MSS53 judgments emphasise that asylum seekers 
must not be transferred to a Member State whose asylum system mani-
fests systematic deficiencies. 
The Draft Dublin III Regulation, if adopted, would provide for a tem-
porary suspension of transfers for six months, extendable once by six 
months, if decided by the Commission and not overruled by the Coun-
cil.54 However, the underlying rationale of the Dublin II Regulation would 
not be changed, as the responsibility for examining the asylum appli-
cation would still lie ‘primarily with the Member State which played the 
50 See European Parliament Study, ‘The Implementation of Article 80 TFEU on the Prin-
ciple of Solidarity and Fair Sharing of Responsibility, Including its Financial Implications, 
Between Member States in the Field of Border Checks, Asylum and Immigration’ April 
2011, PE 453.167.
51 See UNCHR, ‘The Dublin II Regulation – A UNHCR Discussion Paper’ (April 2006). 
52 Joined cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, NS v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
and ME and Others v Refugee Applications Commissioner and Minister for Justice, Equality 
and Law (ECR, 21 December 2011). 
53 MSS v Belgium and Greece App no 30696/09 (ECtHR, 21 January 2011).
54 Art 31 of the Draft Dublin III Regulation. 
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greatest part in the applicant’s entry into or residence on the territories 
of the Member States, subject to exceptions designed to protect family 
unity’. The Draft foresees the role of the European Asylum Support Office 
(EASO) as providing practical assistance and expertise to Member States 
in taking decisions on asylum applications and to Member States under 
disproportionate external pressure. EASO should provide an ‘early war-
ning, preparedness and crisis management mechanism’ which should 
prevent Member States’ systematic deficiencies before they escalate into 
a crisis. 
It remains questionable whether functioning solidarity is compatible 
with the underlying principle of the Dublin ‘state of first entry’ rule in the 
case of the absence of an EU-wide efficient and human-rights compli-
ant system. The current system, of inadequate financial assistance and 
ad hoc responses to emergency situations through intra-EU relocation, 
is insufficient to respond to the challenges ahead. Future EU asylum 
and migration policy should involve a higher degree of solidarity between 
Member States, expressed not only through ad hoc measures, but also 
through systematic responsibility-sharing. EASO should play a key role 
in this context, while new instruments such as joint processing, in addi-
tion to financial solidarity, should also be considered. 
 
